ABSTRACT. The use of public procurement as a vehicle for implementing various socioeconomic preference policies has a long history. This article reviews the current state of affairs of procurement preference programs with regard to U.S. state and local governments and analyzes their impact on both the recipients and on public procurement process. Opportunities for further research are noted, and the authors conclude that the ability to navigate the difficult waters of socioeconomic preferences should be a core competency of state and local public procurement officials.
INTRODUCTION
Public administration has long struggled with the twin goals of equality and efficiency in American government (Okun 1975) . Nowhere is this conflict more evident than in public procurement. In this survey, we inventory the range of preference programs in U.S. state and local government procurement, discuss patterns of practices and trends, analyze their impact on both the recipients and on public procurement process, and offer suggestions for further research. Our primary focus is on preferences for specific types of businesses as well as similar programs. We do not dwell on the subject of general affirmative action policies, as these are frequently tied in with other, existing Federal requirements.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Government has always used its purchasing power as a tool to achieve certain social and political purposes. According to "Selective Purchasing laws," cities, states, and counties have used preference purchasing for more than 200 years. Even before the Revolutionary War, states and local governments used its purchasing power not to buy British goods to boycott the Britain's tax policy. Contemporary governments have extended this usage in much more forms and for a much wider range of purposes.
At the Federal level, a policy favoring U.S. businesses existed during the Civil War, preference for small businesses goes back at least to 1941, and government contract labor standards date as far back as 1917 (Nagle 1999, pp. 181, 306, 427) , and in 1919 it was reported that clauses mandating payment of minimum wages were common in local government contracts (Thomas 1919, p. 58) . There was specific recognition of the importance of socioeconomic programs for state and local governments when the American Bar Association issued its Model Procurement Code in 1979, as one of its twelve Articles concerned assistance to small and disadvantaged businesses.
Preference programs in public procurement have received considerable attention in print and on-line writings. Studies and analyses of these preferences have encompassed procurement journals (Coggburn 2003) , public administration journals (most recently Celec et al., 2003) , law reviews (Brody 1996) , newspapers touting the availability of the programs (Chandonnet, 2002) , official government web sites (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2000) , and even attorneys offering legal assistance on the subject (Gordan, 2001) .
Research on social programs in state and local public procurement is also found in the series of reports sponsored by the National Association of State Procurement Officials' (NASPO). The reports devoted a few pages on the preference treatments in public procurement (The National Association of State Purchasing Officials,1997 and Short, 1993; The Council of State Governments, 1975) .
Forms of Preferences in the State and Local Governments
The sorts of preferences found in state and local government procurement are varied. There are geographical "preference law" and non-geographical one. According to Short (1993) , there are five types of geographical "preference law" in government procurement legislation, as follows.
• The percentage preference law gives in-state or local bidders a specific advantage over out-state or nonresident bidders in the award of public contracts.
• The tie-bid preference law allows in-state or local bidder to win the award if their bids are same as those of nonresident bidders. Nearly all the states and local governments have this policy.
• State and local governments also have adopted "general, often ambiguous, preference law which…ranges from tie-bid preference to a relatively large percentage preference" authorizes administrators to extend "comparable" preference, "in the best interests of the jurisdiction" or "as far as may be practicable." (Short, 1993, p. 71) . Due to its administrative ambiguousness, it is difficult to document or assess this type of preference law.
• The absolute preference law stipulates government must buy certain goods or services within a designated area. Printing is the most common "protected" commodity, followed by coal. Lumber and paper products and such food as milk are protected products in New York and South Dakota.
• The reciprocal preference law gives preference to residents whose state does not have preference laws. More than half of the states have this type of preference laws.
According to NASPO 1975 survey (NASPO, 1975 , 11 states had statutes providing percentage preference from 1.5 to 10% preference to in-state bidders. The 1993 National Institute of Governmental Purchasing survey reported that 24% of respondents gave preference to residents (NASPO, 1997).
Related to geographic preference law is "Buy American" law adopted by numerous state governments. Though rarely formally adopted in local governments, American -made vehicle acquisition and construction materials are preferred in the administrative decisions. While the most commonly specified "Buy American" commodity at state level is beef and steel, a few states require that preference be given to domestic products without specifying the commodities (Short, 1993) .
In addition to geographic preference, many states and local governments have preferences, set aside programs, or mandatory purchase programs for a variety of socioeconomic purposes. Among them are the purchases of environmentally sound products; set aside programs for certain groups including small, minority, disadvantaged, veteran-owned or women-owned businesses.
Though purchasing environmentally friendly law is not classified as preference law, it has its non-economic purpose.
In each case, government believes that social and political benefits from these programs are worth the cost arising from restricted competition. The preference in the set-aside programs are also common on subcontracting basis when a large amount of subcontracting of construction is involved.
Some states also mandate purchase products from the developmental disadvantaged such as those for the deaf and blind. Though generally accepted in the procurement community, they are not without criticisms. To the critics, the industry is already tax subsidized and tax exempt. Further preference through government procurement gives them unfair advantages over other industries. In addition, some states have adopted state-use laws requiring agencies to use government-produced goods such as those made in a prison (National Association of State Procurement Officials, 1997, pp.20-21 ).
The 1998 survey by the National Association of State Procurement Official (NASPO, 1999) found out that
• 27 states have product preferences. 25 states apply to commodities
• 12 states have price preference or set aside for women-owned businesses; • 18 states give price preferences and set-asides to minority-owned businesses;
• 20 states give preference and set-asides to work centers;
• 28 states give preference and set-asides to prison industry;
• 12 states have preference treatment to small businesses;
• 27 states have certification program for minority-owned business;
• 18 states have policies, procedures, or laws assist in balancing the competing interests of preferred sources (products by the blind and handicapped and correctional industries) versus resident, small, minority, and women-owned firms • 15 have "Buy American" laws (NASPO, 1999) On environment issue, the same survey also found that "23 states require a portion of total state purchases be made up of recycled products. Twenty-five states procure and use recycled oil. Forty-three states procure and use alternative vehicle fuels; Forty five states purchase vehicles that utilize alternative fuels. Thirty states purchase soybean ink for state printing" (NASPO, 1999, p. vi) . According to a report released in Raymond Communications website, all 50 states and 200 local governments have laws providing purchasing preference for recycled products ("Purchasing Preferences for Recycled Products").
A more recent socioeconomic program through public purchasing is living wage law, a law "require[ing] employers receiving [government] contracts or [government] business subsidies to pay full-time workers a wage sufficient to support themselves and their families at a subsistence level -typically from $8.5 to $12.00 per hour and to provide health benefits" (Cooper, 2003, p. 1) . In 1994, Baltimore became the first city in the nation to adopt such a law, followed by more than 100 other cities and counties, including Boston, Los Angeles, New York, Portland, Ore., and Detroit (Elmore, 2003 , Macpherson, 2002 . A living wage bill has been introduced in the state of Maryland recently (Wilson, 2004) . If passed, Maryland will become the first living wage law state.
Federal Government Procurement Preference Programs
The federal government, as the largest purchaser in the nation, has adopted the similar preferential treatments in its procurement policy. The Executive Order 12873 on Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention authorized executive agencies to give preference to purchase environmentally friendly products and services. Agency's purchasing decision should be based on considerations of environmental factor together with the traditional ones such as product price and performance ("Environmentally Preferable Purchasing"). The Small Business Act provides the legal base for set-aside programs for small businesses that meet small business size standards for their industry; and small disadvantaged business that are at least 51% owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or stockholder ("Reinventing federal procurement).
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, among other things, "established a new 5% government-wide procurement goal for women-owned business. This includes a 5 percent goal for prime contract award and a 5% goal for subcontract awards. A women-owned business is defined as a small business that is at least 51 percent owned by one or more women (Office of Women's Business Ownership, p. 3).
Controversies over Procurement Preference Programs
There are several logics behind these preferential programs. Geographic preference programs are expected to encourage businesses stay locally, create more jobs, and increase local tax revenues (NASPO, 1975) . Many of the absolute preference laws had their roots in 19 th century local politics. For instance, preference is given to printing because in most of the 19 th century, "public printing contracts helped support the back shops of the local partisan press which, in turn, supported a given local political party" (Short, 1993, p. 70) . Preferential treatment for minority and women-owned business are to redress past discrimination and ongoing disadvantages. The "Buy America" is to protect American products. Living wage laws go beyond minimum wage to guarantee a decent salary so that they can get out of poverty.
These programs are criticized on many fronts. These preference laws are inherently anti-competition. Many critics believe that they violate the basic principles of public purchasing: equity, impartiality, open competition and the lease cost to the taxpayer. Economically, these programs provide subsidies that are costly to the taxpayers. In addition, the practice discourages competition, which would lead tax-payers paying a higher cost. For example, a survey by a National Association of State Purchasing Officials committee in 1970s showed that prices usually were increased by the amount of the preference percentages, and eventually by more than this amount.
The National Association of State Purchasing Officials has consistently been against the practice of preference treatments. "Preference provisions and practices should be eliminated from public purchasing. Government bodies and legislatures must recognize that preference is promoted by business and special interest groups, that the net effect is costly, and that efforts to establish or maintain preference need to be resisted" (NASPO, 1975, p. 9.4) . The National Institute of Governmental Purchasing holds the same view (Short, 1993) .
Geographic preference laws have been challenged in the courts many times throughout the entire 20 th century. In most of the early cases, the courts did not address the interstate commerce issue raised in in-state and local preference laws. Instead they upheld many of these practices under the concept of sovereign immunity which protect government from tort liability and the power to make long term contracts.
Since 1970s, the court started to apply commerce clause in reviewing in-state and local preference laws. In 1988, the Federal District Court in Arkansas reviews two separate Arkansas preference statutes which were challenged on the basis of commerce clause, equal protection, privileges and immunity and due process. One statute requiring contractors to pay certain local taxes for two successive years was upheld since nonresident contractors may become qualified if they pay the taxes. The other statute which granted 5% preference to resident firms in the purchase of commodities was struck down on the ground that "the criteria for qualification [of resident firms] as expressed in the statute sufficiently vague as to constitute violation of the due process clause.
Preference laws to aid local, small, minority and women-owned business and to protect American manufacturers have been challenged on the ground of "effectiveness, equity, and legality" (Short, 1993, p. 73) . In an early case-Fullilove v. Klutznick, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal 10% setting aside for minority requirement in grants made under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. The Court stated that the Congress' authority under the commerce clause "was sufficiently broad to influence how contractors on federal funded local construction projects performed" (Short, 1993, p. 74) . The court also established the criterion that "the remedy must be specific and appropriate" (Short, 1993, p. 74 Richmond failed to demonstrate their past discrimination in the city's own construction procurement. The Plan was not narrowly focused since it permitted minorities from outside the Richmond area to participate in an absolute preference over other citizens purely on race… (quoted in Short, 1993, p. 75) .
In a 1996 case-Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 2 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that government set-aside programs must be subject to "strict scrutiny" and must be narrowly tailored to achieve a "compelling government interest." (quoted in Janda, Berry & Goldman, 2002, p. 542) . Under the strict scrutiny test, few government set-aside programs can meet the criteria. Indeed, the recent court cases have seen the legality of set-aside programs remains under cloud.
Interestingly, neither Richmond case nor Adarand case concerned the award of prime contracts set aside for minority firms or price preferences in prime contract awards. Useful historical reviews of the subject, culminating in a discussion of these two cases, are Brody (1996) , Rice (1991) , and Rice and Mongkuo (1998) . The Federal Government's official positions are found in documents issued by the U.S. Department of Justice (1995) and U.S. Small Business Administration (2000) . Following the Adarand decision, nearly two dozen states introduced bills to limit or ban public procurement preferences (Rice & Mongkou, 1998, p. 85 ) and as of 2003, 19 states had eliminated minority set-asides (Coggburn, 2003, p. 11) .
In Adarand decision, the Supreme Court also implied that, based on Croson decision, a disparity analysis could serve as the basis for a valid preference (Rice & Mongkou, 1998) . Consequently, many jurisdictions have conducted (or contracted for) disparity studies, as compiled by Enchautegui, et al. (1997) . For example, the City of Phoenix, Arizona issued a "Request for Qualifications" in 2004 to acquire a disparity study "to evaluate marketplace discrimination, if any, against minority/ woman-owned and small business enterprises." The study, an update of a prior effort, was budgeted at $250,000. The methodologies used to perform disparity studies have become the subject of much debate (Rice, 1992 , Celec et al., 2000 , and a handbook has been published to help local officials develop proper disparity studies (La Noue, 1994) .
While procurement programs are criticized and challenged, empirical research on its impact is limited. According to NASPO (1999) , "there is no substantial body of data" to suggest the gain for the preferential group is worth the cost incurred by taxpayers, including the losses due to restricted competition. Concerning on living wage law has generated both "pro" side and "con" side. Both sides have produced empirical studies supporting their respective positions (see, for example, Kraut et al., 2000; Reynolds, 1999; Macpherson, 2002; Tolley et al., 1999) . A more recent study conducted by Brennan Center of New York City University's School of Law recently found that local governments with living wage law have experienced only modestly and did not prevent cities from attracting new economic development (Cooper) .
There have been several Federally-sponsored research reports on state and local government "buying green" programs, primarily in the form of case studies, including the commonwealth of Massachusetts (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b), the city of Santa Monica, California (U.S. EPA 1998a), and a general compendium of state and local government experience (U.S. EPA 2000). Each of these studies touts the benefits of the program. The last of these studies examines the range of procurement methods in practice at various jurisdictions, including price preferences, "best value" purchasing, and vendor fairs and surveys. Wallace (1999) case study that focuses on structural barriers to access information for women and minority-owned firms examine the extent to which minority procurement activities facilitate minority community economic development in the absence of federal goal. Wallace concluded that "the continued minority procurement activity is necessary for overall community economic development" (p. 73). As a case study, Wallace (1999) finding cannot be generalized to preference programs in other jurisdictions. It did not address many other issues, either.
The most extensive survey of state and local government procurement preferences to date is Enchautegui et al. (1997) . Undertaken by the Urban Institute, this study surveyed all states to find empirical studies of disparity in awards to minority contractors. (An example of such a study, completed after Enchautegui's publication, is Erickcek & Goheen, 2001 ). Enchautegui and her co-authors found 95 studies, and combined the results of 58 of them spanning 18 states and the District of Columbia into a summary analysis giving a national picture of disparity in contracting. The authors concluded that disparities are greater where no procurement preference programs exist (pp. xiv, 27).
While disparity studies have been the most common area of research, understanding on many other aspects of procurement preference practices are limited. In the current study, the authors want to find out what forms of preferences government agencies use in the procurement process, examining how they determine eligibility for preference, where they get authority to implement preference program, and what mechanism they use to provide preference. We will also look at the impacts of these programs on public procurement process and on recipients (if we have the data)
METHODOLOGY
An online survey was sent to 2068 National Institute of Governmental Procurement (NIGP) members during Oct 1 -12, 2004. Of these, 173 invitations were not delivered. 256 responded the survey. The responding rate is 13.5%. The result is analyzed in the SPSS.
As the response rate of the 2004 survey is too low to reach valid findings, another wave of questionnaire was mailed to 2,110 NIGP members in August, 2006.
The authors recognize that this survey is not a representative sample, because not all public procurement officers are NIGP members. Combined with the low response rate, the findings should be interpreted with caution. Still, this is a reasonable approach to gorge the current use of preference/social programs. Who use better about these social programs in procurement than procurement professional in NIGP?
FINDINGS
In this finding section, we will first report the profile of the survey respondents. Then we will present and discuss findings about preference programs: types of programs, the eligibility of preference, the legal basis of the programs, and mechanism for giving preferences.
Profile of Respondents
As shown in Table 1 , most of the respondents come from city/municipal governments (45% of total respondents) and county/regional government (23%). The third largest source of respondents (13%) is states. All other government entities have very small number of respondents. As shown in Table 2 , 47% of the respondents hold bachelor's degree and 26% graduate degree. Only nine percent hold high school degrees. This indicates that the respondents as a group are reasonably well educated. A majority of the respondents are white (86%), as shown in Table 3 . Table 4 , respondents reported a wide range of annual procurement amount. The most concentrated amount (21% of the respondents) is that below $5 million. Table 5 shows the sizes of population where the respondents come from. While the spread is relatively even, the highest percentage (19%) is from communities with population of 100,000 -250,000. Table 6 shows that the most common preference programs are local business (87 respondents or 34%) and minority business (81 respondents or 32%), follow by women-owned business (65 respondents or 25%), drug-free workplace (64 respondents or 25%) and recycled products (59 respondents). Only 45 respondents reported that they give preference to small business, and 30 respondents to buying American. None respondent indicated that they use "domestic violence" as a criterion to give preference. (Is it because the wording? Should we use "no domestic violence"?) All other preference is used to a very limited extent. Seventy respondents or 27.3% of the total respondents stated that they do not have any preference programs at all. This seems to be a significant amount, but we do not have historical data to compare with. While NASPO previous surveys documents the number of states that used each preference program as reviewed in the literature review, their subjects were states, and the current one includes all types of jurisdictions. In NASPO survey, the highest number of states that implements any of the programs is 28 out of the 50. The fact that 27% of respondents that do not have any preference programs is one of the explanations for the high rate of missing data for many of the questions that asked later.
The respondents also reported many other forms of preference in their procurement process. Examples are construction apprenticeship programs, construction local workforce, child care, ethics/political contributions, prevailing wages, contracts funded through CDBG, instate preference and many more. See Appendix 1 for all the descriptions.
The authors also calculated the total number of preference programs that a community uses in its government procurement process. The result is reported in Table 7 . Twenty-four percent communities use only one of the preference program; Twelve percent implement two programs. Eight percent has three forms of the preference programs. Only two communities (less than 1%) have 10 of the preference programs, and no one implements more than ten. Why some communities have implemented more forms of preference programs than others? The authors ran cross-tabulations between the number of preference programs that a community uses and population size, annual procurement purchasing amount, and types of governments. The results show that the correlation between number of preference programs and the population size, and the correlation between number of preference programs and the type of government are statistically significant (see Tables 8 and 9 ). All other variables (e.g., the annual procurement spending and the respondents' education level) are not statistically related to the number of preference forms of procurement programs.
TABLE 8

Cross-Tabulation of Population Size and the Number of Preference Programs Used by a Jurisdiction
Population ( As shown in Table 8 , larger jurisdictions usually have more types of preference programs than small one. This makes means, because many preference programs started in big cities. Government agencies in big cities have more pressure and more resources to implement preference programs. A good example is the living wage. It is most implemented in big cities (Wilson, 2004) . Table 9 seems to indicate that city/municipals, county/regional governments, and states tend to have more preference programs than other types of governments. Then how do government agencies determine eligibility for their preference programs when they implement such programs? The results to this question are reported in Table 10 . One-third of the respondents stated that they do not have any special system in place. This group may be the one that reported they did not have any preference programs. Among those who do have preference programs, eligibility for preference is most likely to be determined by using state-prescribed definitions (36% of the respondents), followed by self-certification by contractors/officers. Use of federally-prescribed definitions is least likely to be used. Where do government agencies get authority for their procurement preference program: state law, local law, ordinance, or administrative order of government, or written policy of the procurement office? Findings are reported in Table 11 . As shown, 44% of the respondents recognize state law as the legal basis for their preference programs; and slightly small number of respondents (41%) recognizes local laws. This is consistent with the data in Table 10 where state-prescribed definition is the most likely definition for preference. Twenty-four percent stated that they rely on written policies. Government agencies can derive authorities for preference program from multiple sources. In this survey, 14 respondents reported that they use state laws, local laws, and written policies for their legal basis. Thirty-four reports that they derive their authority from two of the sources. The respondents also provide their websites that state the legal basis for their preference programs. These web sites are reported in Appendix 2.
The questionnaires also asked about the mechanism for giving preferences from several aspects. First, we would like to know manner in which preference is given to each preference programs. Is it by goals for contract awards, vendor action mandated by contract, mandatory source, price preference, set-aside subs action mandated by contract, subcontracting goals, solicit offers from designated groups, tie bid breakers, technical R.F.P. score? Unfortunately, there are extremely few responses to these questions, and we cannot make any discussion here.
Second, we are interested in finding out any thresholds to which preference/social programs apply both in dollar amount and as percentage used. Again, the overall responding rate is low. There are more respondents providing the thresholds for small business, womenowned business, minority-owned business, drug free workplace, recycled products than other social programs. It is the same with threshold in terms of percentage. Based on the limited respondents, the maximum dollar limits set by jurisdictions vary a great deal, ranging from low (e.g., 0) to no limit. The number of respondents and the thresholds they provided are all listed in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.
Third, we also want to find out whether each preference/social program is applied to goods, services, professional services, and construction service. The responding rate is low but is worth reporting. The results are reported in Table 12 . Table 12 , we made two observations. First, for a relatively high number of jurisdictions, preference to local businesses and minority-owned business are applied to all types of purchases, compared with other programs. Next "popular" social program seems to be drug free program. About 40 respondents stated that they give preference to drug-free workplace in the four types of purchasing. It is interesting to see more respondents identify preference in drug-free workplace program than small business. Our second observation is that generally speaking, for almost all the programs, preference is given more often to goods (especially for buying American, prison products, and recycled product programs) than any other three types of purchasing. But there are three exceptions: drug-free workplace, insurance for employees, and living wage. For these three programs, more respondents indicate preferences are given to services and construction services than goods.
POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS
Crosstab between education level and perception of whether preference practices violate a major principle of free market: open competition. Pearason Chi-Square: .000 df: 40
The Pearson Chi-Square is .000, which means there is statistically significant correlation between the education level with how they perceive the preferential treatment. However, the spread of the data does not show this. Among each education level, there is about 30-44% of them tend to agree or strongly agree with the statement.
Crosstab between education level and perception of whether my government has to pay a higher price to meet preference requirement. Pearson Chi-Square: .000 df: 25.
There is a significant correlation between race and how they perceive the favorable practices. The whites are more likely to see the practice to be violating the free market principle than Blacks. Blacks are more likely to have that perception than Hispanics.
Race and whether my government has to pay a higher price to meet preference requirements: A crosstabulation Pearson Chi -Square: .000; DF : 25.
As data in the table above shows a larger percentage of Whites tends to agree with the statement that my government has to pay a higher price to meet preference requirements than Blacks and Hispanics. Among the three races, Hispanics have the lowest percentage of respondents strongly agree with this statement (7.5%) but a very high percentage of respondents agree with the statement.
Race and the perception whether my government's purchased goods and services are of lower quality due to the preference requirement:
A crosstabulation Pearson Ch-Square: .000; df: 25.
One-third (171) of the respondents have "no opinion." For each race, 36-38% of the respondents disagree that the practice lowers the quality of the purchased goods and services. Only among Hispanic respondents, there is a lower percentage of such respondents (e.g., 27% disagree and 19.6% strongly disagree) . A larger percentage of whites strongly agree with the statement than Black and Hispanics and other races. But the Blacks have 8.7% agree with the statement as compared with 7.1% of White and 7.5% of Hispanics.
CONCLUSION AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As stated in the literature review section, public procurement preference program is a very important and controversial issue, but research on many of its facets is limited. Disparity studies have been the most common area of research in this field, primarily because of the Supreme Court decisions defining the parameters in which minority business programs may operate. Many other important issues in this field remain to be studied empirically, and the practical impact of preferences is worthy of much more analysis. All too often, a program is put in place, perhaps largely for political reasons, but a longitudinal review of its results is never conducted.
The current study contributes to our understanding about procurement preference programs in several ways. It documents what social programs are in use, and to what extent, how government agencies define eligibility and the authority to implement these programs. In addition, it also reveals to certain extent whether the preference programs are applied to goods, services, professional service, or constructions. Though the responding rate is low, the findings reported in this paper does add to our insight about the current practice of procurement preference programs.
Additional research is warranted to assess the practical effects of preference programs on public procurement procedures, benefits, and costs. If these programs are to accomplish their purpose, then they are worthy of further research. The following are some examples:
• Success rates and benefits achieved by specific preference programs
• Cost to administer preference programs
• Measurement issues (which measures or indicators have validity)
• Alternative approaches (such as whether alternatives to set-asides or price preferences like education/training, mentor-protégé programs, or use of Small Business Administration programs and tools are more effective, etc.)
We conclude by stating that the ability to navigate through preference programs should be a core competency of all public procurement professionals. At the Federal level, NCMA's CMBOK includes skill in socioeconomic programs as one of 71 critical abilities for the Federal acquisition workforce. The same level of skill is required for state and local public procurement, as this survey has demonstrated.
NOTES
1. The City of Richmond provided a preference in subcontracting for firms using 30% minority subcontracting under a city construction contract.
2. This case dealt with a subcontract award under a local transportation authority's prime contract using Federal funds that mandated 10% subcontracting with minority businesses.
